I think your article does a good job of explaining why physicalists believe what they do. Your argument is clear, concise and laid out in logical order. But for criticism of the strength of those physicalist beliefs, the entire argument strikes me an extended case of question begging, reasons to ignore the evidence against physicalism and stick with it anyway.
Your first point, that “consciousness is a rare, localized natural phenomenon that only arises under extremely specific conditions” is only true if we assume some kind of not-panpsychist form of physicalism. The question is, how do you know that? Since there is no way to observe consciousness directly, what physical feature have you identified with the presence of consciousness such that you can then declare it to be rare, localized and natural? To answer that, you must first - assume as true - your preferred physicalist theory.
Your second point is to rule out dualism because the history of the success of science shows that causal closure is most likely true. But consider this argument from the dualist, (or any non-physicalist) point of view. It’s physicalism’s historical failure to explain the mind that motivates their non-physicalist theory in the first place. As you say in your footnote, this needs to qualified with – “putting aside consciousness”.
It also strikes me as historical revisionism. You assume the physicalists concept of what we mean by the word “physical”, which then entails any failed explanations must have proposed that certain phenomena were “non-physical” (or commonly, you find people calling them “supernatural”). But this is a narrow reading of the situation. For example, Bergson’s elan vital can’t be adequately presented as a theory to explain the functions of life rather than a broader appeal to “spirit”, or the myriad range of phenomena that non-physicalist’s point to for justifying their rejection of physicalism.
Your last point is that introspection can’t give us accurate information about the metaphysics of consciousness. But that seems obviously false, since the “only” way to know consciousness exists and what its properties are is introspection. There’s nothing obscure about consciousness, you know your conscious states directly and without any doubt. It only seems obscure if you first assume it must be physical - against all contrary observed introspective evidence - due to a prior commitment to physicalism. No one is suggesting we use introspection to gain knowledge of brain processes. This assumption that what’s at stake in an explanation of consciousness is brain processes, already assumes physicalism is true.
Great post!
Great post!
Fantastic post, BSB! I'm too groggy to come up with a coherent comment right now, but I really appreciated reading this, even though I'm a dualist.
Fantastic post. Very clearly articulated
I support every word of it.
Thank you!
I think your article does a good job of explaining why physicalists believe what they do. Your argument is clear, concise and laid out in logical order. But for criticism of the strength of those physicalist beliefs, the entire argument strikes me an extended case of question begging, reasons to ignore the evidence against physicalism and stick with it anyway.
Your first point, that “consciousness is a rare, localized natural phenomenon that only arises under extremely specific conditions” is only true if we assume some kind of not-panpsychist form of physicalism. The question is, how do you know that? Since there is no way to observe consciousness directly, what physical feature have you identified with the presence of consciousness such that you can then declare it to be rare, localized and natural? To answer that, you must first - assume as true - your preferred physicalist theory.
Your second point is to rule out dualism because the history of the success of science shows that causal closure is most likely true. But consider this argument from the dualist, (or any non-physicalist) point of view. It’s physicalism’s historical failure to explain the mind that motivates their non-physicalist theory in the first place. As you say in your footnote, this needs to qualified with – “putting aside consciousness”.
It also strikes me as historical revisionism. You assume the physicalists concept of what we mean by the word “physical”, which then entails any failed explanations must have proposed that certain phenomena were “non-physical” (or commonly, you find people calling them “supernatural”). But this is a narrow reading of the situation. For example, Bergson’s elan vital can’t be adequately presented as a theory to explain the functions of life rather than a broader appeal to “spirit”, or the myriad range of phenomena that non-physicalist’s point to for justifying their rejection of physicalism.
Your last point is that introspection can’t give us accurate information about the metaphysics of consciousness. But that seems obviously false, since the “only” way to know consciousness exists and what its properties are is introspection. There’s nothing obscure about consciousness, you know your conscious states directly and without any doubt. It only seems obscure if you first assume it must be physical - against all contrary observed introspective evidence - due to a prior commitment to physicalism. No one is suggesting we use introspection to gain knowledge of brain processes. This assumption that what’s at stake in an explanation of consciousness is brain processes, already assumes physicalism is true.